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BRIEF OF APPELLANT HENRY A. TOTZKE 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Did the court err in excluding inherited property 
from consideration in its division of marital assets solely 
because it was inherited? 
B. Did the court err in ordering Appellant to pay 
$600.0 0 per month in child support when the evidence showed 
that Respondent has greater assets than Appellant, more than 
adequate income, and there was no evidence presented as to 
the child's needs? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce action originally tried before Judge 
Ronald 0. Hyde in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber 
County. Appellant appeals from the Memorandum Decisionf 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Decree of 
Divorce entered May 6, 1986, contesting the property division 
and child support order. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were married on January 27, 1962 (R. at 
71). At the time of the marriage. Appellant was a medical 
resident and Respondent was finishing her degree in education 
(R. at 72). Shortly thereafter, Respondent taught school for 
two years in Texas, quitting upon the birth of her first 
child (R. at 73). Four children were born of the marriage 
(R. at 44). Two presently attend college (R. at 71) and two 
are minors, Michael Totzke, born April 8, 1969, and Chris 
Totzke, born April 28, 1973 (R. at 44). Upon stipulation 
Appellant has custody of Michael and Respondent has custody 
of Chris (R. at 54). 
During the marriage, Appellant received $50,000 through 
inheritance (R. at 117) . This money was used for marital 
purposes (R. at 85). In 1966, Respondent's father died and 
his estate went into a 10 year trust. Respondent received 
Arkansas timber lands and stocks from the trust in 1976 (R. 
at 85-86). The income and dividends from those properties 
has totaled approximately $225,000 (R. at 87). The income 
for 1980-1985 averaged $45,000 a year (R. at 95), though 
Respondent testified the amount of profits will go down (R. 
at 88). This income was always put back into the family and 
used to increase marital assets (R. at 46, 87). At no time 
prior to the divorce did Respondent indicate to Appellant 
that she viewed the lands and stocks as her separate property 
(R. at 126). 
Throughout the entire 24 year marriage, all monies were 
treated jointly by the parties, whether they came from 
Appellant's salary, Respondent's teaching, or income and 
dividends from the properties (R. at 126) . The income was 
placed in joint accounts and joint investments, and all 
expenses were paid from those accounts (R. at 126). Income 
tax returns were always filed jointly during the marriage (R. 
at 127). Prior to the divorce, there was never any 
disagreement between the parties regarding the joint use of 
funds (R. at 126). Appellant viewed all property as being 
joint (R. at 127) and Respondent never said that she viewed 
some of the property as hers as opposed to theirs (R. at 126). 
Appellant is employed as a pathologist and earns 
approximately $140,000 a year (R. at 161). His average net 
income following payment of taxes, pension plan and 
professional corporation expenses for 1985 was $4,800 a month 
(R. at 145, Def. Ex. 8). Appellant introduced a list of his 
expenses at trial (Def. Ex. 3 and 4), and testified that his 
checks for a 12 month period averaged out to $4,840 per month 
(R. at 153). In addition to paying household costs and his 
own expenses, Appellant supports the sixteen year old boy in 
his custody. Both parties state that they want to support 
all four children through college (R. at 101, 156), and costs 
are estimated at $8,000 per year per child (R. at 101-102). 
Costs for supporting the two children currently in college 
average $1,300 a month (R. at 155). Respondent did not 
introduce any evidence of her expenses at trial, beyond 
stating that her rent is $800.00 a month (R. at 106). She 
also did not testify as to the financial needs of the child 
in her custody. 
Other than the initial few years in which she taught 
school, Respondent has not been employed during the marriage 
(R. at 74). She could certify to teach in Utah with 6-9 
hours of training (R. at 98). She chooses not to teach at 
the present time because of the emotional commitment (R. at 
76), and works as a food service supervisor/cashier at Park 
City Resort (R. at 75). She could increase her income by 
$4,000 to $8,000 per year if she resumed teaching (R. at 
100). 
Respondent was awarded all of the income producing 
property of the marriage (R. at 143) . She was awarded all of 
the inherited property now valued at $381,500, as her sole 
and separate property (R. at 54). The balance of the marital 
assets, totaling $749,100, were divided equally, with the 
court ordering Appellant to pay Respondent an additional 
$102,250 over the next 9 years as an equalizing factor (R. at 
58). A list of the properties divided and their 
corresponding values is attached as Exhibit A. 
By court order, the parties now stand in this position: 
Respondent 
Marital Estate Division $ 272,300 (R. at 22 & 32) 
Payment from Appellant $ 102,250 (R. at 22) 
to the Respondent 
equalizing marital estate 
division 
Sub-total 
Inherited Property 
TOTAL 
$ 374,550 
$ 381,500 
$ 756,050 
(R. at 54-55) 
Appellant 
Marital Estate Division 
Payment from Appellant 
to Respondent equalizing 
marital estate division 
Sub-total 
TOTAL 
$ 476,800 
- $ 102,250 
$ 374,550 
$ 374,550 
(R. at 22) 
(R. at 22) 
Respondent has employment income of $6.00 an hour (R. 
at 75), income from property of $45,000 per year (R. at 77) 
and, under the court's decree, payment of $1,436.00 monthly 
(or $17,272 annually) from Appellant to amortize the $102,050 
equalizing obligation (R. at 57-58). Her total annual 
income (without child support) equals: 
Work ($6.00 X 2000 hours) 
Property 
Appellant's equaling payments 
$ 12,000 
$ 45,000 
$ 17,274 
TOTAL $ 74,274 
The court held that in addition to being the sole 
support of Michael, Appellant should pay Respondent $600.00 
per month in child support. (R. at 58). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant argues that the inherited properties should 
not have been excluded from the marital estate simply because 
they were inherited. A factual analysis should be applied in 
each case to see if the inherited property was treated as a 
joint asset by the parties during the marriage. The 
decisions of other jurisdictions addressing this issue 
support a review of the facts of each situation, rather than 
an exclusion of the property per se because it was inherited. 
The facts of this case show that the inherited lands 
and stocks have been treated as a family asset since their 
acquisition. Indeed, all income of the parties was used 
jointly throughout the marriage, including the dividends from 
the inherited properties. Respondent never indicated that 
she viewed the assets as her separate property until the 
divorce. Accordingly, Apellant asks that the trial court's 
decision be remanded to include inherited property in the 
marital estate for purposes of reaching an equitable 
distribution. 
Appellant further seeks reversal of the trial court's 
order that he pay Respondent $600.00 a month in child 
support. The primary focus in child support questions is on 
the needs of the child and the ability of the parent to 
provide support. No evidence was introduced at trial as to 
the child's needs. Appellant maintains that Respondent has 
more than sufficient income to support the child in her 
custody and accordingly seeks remand of the child support 
order. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE INHERITED 
PROPERTIES FROM THE MARITAL ESTATE SOLELY BECAUSE 
THEY WERE INHERITED 
Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's property 
distribution awarding Respondent all lands and stocks she 
inherited during the marriage as her separate property. The 
facts of this case warrant the inclusion of the inherited 
property in the marital estate, and Appellant argues that the 
trial court's decision was inequitable and represents a 
sufficient abuse of discretion to require reversal. 
The distribution of marital property in a divorce 
action is governed by U.C.A., 1953, Section 35-3-5 (1985 
ed.) f which reads in part: "When a decree of divorce is 
rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property and parties". 
Appellant contests the trial court's division under 
this statute on two grounds: 
1) The exclusion of inherited proprty from the 
marital estate is not justified when the sole 
reason for exclusion is the fact that it was 
inherited; and 
2) The particular facts of this case warrant the 
inclusion of the inherited property when dividing 
the parties' marital assets. 
A. The Court Should Apply a Factual Analysis In 
Divorce Proceedings Involving Inherited 
Property. 
Appellant maintains that neither Utah statutes or case 
law require that inherited property be excluded per se from 
the marital estate. Each case is to be decided on the basis 
of its facts, MacDonald v^ . MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 
1066, 1069 (1951), and the source of an asset is not 
determinative. This approach was used in this Court's 
analysis in the recent case of Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 
705 (Utah 1982) . 
Preston was a divorce action which raised the question 
of division of inherited property. The husband sought, in 
part, a half interest in the inherited property the wife 
brought to the seven year marriage. Both had been married 
before. The trial court awarded the inherited property to 
the wife. In reviewing the distribution on appeal, this 
Court did not state that the property should go to the wife 
because it was inherited. Rather, the Court reviewed the 
facts of the case, including the short duration of the 
marriage, the husband's efforts in working on the property 
(consisting of primarily nearby land parcels), and whether 
the property was a "family project". After reviewing all of 
the facts, the Court found it equitable to deny the husband a 
share in the inherited lands and correspondingly deny the 
wife an interest in the husband's separate property 
contributed to a family cabin, isi. at 76. 
Such a factual analysis is lacking here. The trial 
court excluded the property from the Totzke marital estate 
without making any findings regarding either the character of 
the inherited property (i.e. whether it was a family asset) 
or the parties1 respective efforts in maintaining the assets 
once acquired. The lands and stock were awarded to 
Respondent merely because they were inherited. 
Under the ruling of MacDonald vs. MacDonald. cited 
above and discussed in detail later, the source of an asset 
is but one factor to be considered by the court in making an 
equitable distribution. This Court has held that the title 
to property is not determinative in asset division in a 
divorce proceeding. In Workman vs. Workman. 652 P.2d 931 
(Utah 1982) , a decision rendered shortly after Preston, this 
Court held (quoting Jackson vs. Jackson. 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 
(Utah 1980): 
The state of title to marital property prior to a 
divorce decree is not necessarily binding on the 
trial court in its distribution of such property 
pursuant to such decree. The trial court is 
empowered to make such distributions as are just 
and equitable, and may compel such conveyances as 
are necessary to that end. 
In some instances, equity will require that each 
party to a divorce recover the separate property he 
or she brought to the marriage. E.g.. Preston v. 
Preston, Utah, 646 P.2d 705 (1982). However, that 
rule is not invariable. . . 
Workman, at 933. 
Appellant argues that this is not a case where 
Respondent should be awarded all of the property inherited 
during the marriage. It is not suggested that inherited 
property should always be included in the marital estate. 
Rather, it should be analyzed under the same framework used 
in Preston, and not automatically excluded because of its 
source. 
This factual approach has been followed in other 
jurisdictions. Mack v. Mack, 389 So. 2d 1156 (Ala. Cir App. 
1980) involved facts similar to the case at hand. In Mack, 
the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama reviewed the trial 
court's award to the husband of inherited property valued at 
approximately $300,000. The wife appealed, arguing that the 
property division was inadequate because the trial court 
refused to consider the husband's inheritance in fashioning 
the decree. The appellate court held: 
While the source of the marital property may be 
considered, along with other circumstances and 
factors, it is not controlling. Mullins v. 
Mullins, Ala. Civ. App., 344 So.2d 511, cert, 
denied, 344 So.2d 515 (1977). In making an 
equitable division of the property, there is no 
requirement that the trial court should attempt to 
put aside assets obtained in the past by 
inheritance or gift when these assets become the 
property of both spouses. Bouler v. Bouler. 
Ala.Civ.App., 366 So.2d 290 (1979); Campbell v^ 
Campbell, supra. Thus, there is no error in 
ordering the sale and division of property owned by 
one party merely because that party inherited the 
property, provided the equities require such a 
step. Mullins ju Myqiifts, syipya. 
I£. at 1159. 
In reviewing the facts of that case, the Court noted 
that while the husband did work during the marriage, "[h]ere 
there was uncontroverted evidence, in this instance, the 
parties had used the inherited property and the income 
produced therefrom to support their chosen style of living." 
Id. at 1160. Accordingly, the Court found it was reversible 
error for the trial court to have focused entirely on the 
inherited nature of the property, rather than considering 
additional factors (age, length of marriage, future prospects 
of parties, etc.) in dividing the marital assets. Id. at 
1159-60. 
In similar fashion, Appellant argues that it was 
reversible error for the trial court to focus only on the 
source of the property in the matter at hand. As in Mack, 
the parties here also used the income from the inherited 
properties to supplement family revenue. The evidence 
supports a finding that the Totzkes intended the inherited 
properties to be used jointly. The income generated by the 
properties was spent on joint business projects, and the 
parties used joint banking accounts and joint tax returns. 
The Supreme Court of Alaska has held properties 
originally owned separately may be divided equally upon 
divorce, where the facts indicate that the assets were 
treated jointly during the marriage* In Rossen v. Rossen, 
635 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1981), the wife brought substantial real 
estate to the parties' marriage. She and her husband merged 
their businessesf she being a real estate broker and he a 
contractor. The marriage lasted under two years. In 
reviewing the lower court's equal division of property, the 
Court noted: 
At trial, the court found that the parties had made 
no effort during the time they lived together to 
separate their property and funds. The parties 
treated all monies received and all expenses paid 
as joint monies and expenses. They jointly applied 
their efforts and financial resources to the 
operation of their business. The court concluded 
that it was the intent of the parties to treat all 
property, whether initially separate or joint, as 
joint property, with the exception of two parcels 
of land owned by Shirley that Thomas agreed Shirley 
could have. 
Id. at 470. 
The Alaska Court found these facts constituted 
sufficient evidence to support the court's findings that the 
parties intended to treat all property (except for the two 
parcels) jointly. The Court upheld the equal division of the 
assets noting that the wife had invested little capital in 
their joint affairs and would have gained much if they had 
been successful and that she should accordingly share in the 
losses• Appellant asks this Court to similarly rule that the 
parties here treated the inherited assets as joint property 
during the marriage, and that as such the assets are subject 
to division. 
The importance of analyzing each inheritance issue 
according to its facts was further emphasized in Vivian v. 
Vivian, 583 P.2d 1072 (Mont. 1978). There the Supreme Court 
of Montana was asked to review a distribution where the 
husband's inheritance was deducted from the value of the 
parties' home prior to dividing the marital estate. The wife 
claimed error in the exclusion and the Montana Court agreed, 
citing to an earlier decision wherein it addressed the issue 
as follows: 
This Court, in Morse v. Morse (1977), Mont., 571 
P.2d 1147, 34 St.Rep. 1334, held that an 
inheritance received during the marriage is a 
marital asset. We went on to explain that this 
holding meant that an inheritance had to be taken 
into consideration in dividing the assets. 
However, in Morse, we recognized that no definite 
rule could be established as to how the trial court 
was to consider this asset. Each case has to be 
decided on its own facts. 
I£. at 1074. 
The inclusion of inherited property to arrive at an 
equitable property division was also upheld in Sheedy v, 
Sheedy, 1 Hawaii App. 595, 623 P.2d 95 (1981). Sheedy 
involved parties who married after the husband had graduated 
from medical school and divorced 21 years later. The trial 
court awarded the husband one half of the wife's inheritance. 
On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals upheld the 
decision, noting that the pertinent state statute allowed the 
court to distribute all property of either or both parties 
subject only to the qualification that the division be 
equitable. The court noted that "the award to husband of 
one-half the value of wife's inheritance from his father's 
estate is not to be viewed in isolation. Rather, it must be 
viewed as an integral part of the entire division and 
distribution", Xfii. at 96. 
See also McGain v^ McGain, 219 Kan. 780, 549 P.2d 896 
(1976) where the Supreme Court of Kansas stated that 
inherited property should not be per se excluded from a 
marital estate division. 
Appellant asks that the analysis of the above courts be 
followed in reviewing the inherited property at issue. In 
addition, Appellant states that the Utah Court has also 
recognized that inherited property may properly be included 
in determining the value of the marital estate. In 
MacDonald, the parties filed for divorce in January of 1950. 
During that year, the wife inherited $8,000. The trial court 
listed the balance of the inheritance ($6,948.25) as an asset 
of the parties and awarded it to the wife upon distribution. 
While the case did not raise the specific issue of inherited 
funds, the Court upheld the property division and commented 
on the inheritance, saying, "True, this cash is hers, but it 
was properly taken into account in appraising the entire 
financial situation of the parties and adjusting their 
property rights." Id. at 1070. 
Appellant asks this Court to find that the trial court 
abused its discretion in not including the inherited property 
in its division of the marital estate. The above cases 
support a factual analysis of each inheritance question and 
the specific facts of this matter warrant the property's 
inclusion. 
B. The Facts of this Case Justify Treating 
th& Inherited Properties as Marital 
Aggetg. 
As stated above, the Utah statute governing property 
distribution requires that the court do it equitably. While 
this directive is broad, it is not without limitations. This 
Court has referred to the trial court's responsibility in 
property distribution as follows: 
In the distribution of the marital estate, there is 
no fixed rule or formula. The statutory standard 
is established in Section 30-3-5, the court may 
make such orders in relation to the parties as may 
be equitable. The responsibility of the trial 
court is to endeavor to provide a just and 
equitable adjustment of their economic resources so 
that the parties might reconstruct their lives on a 
happy and useful basis. In adjusting the rights 
and obligations of the parties, this court listed 
fifteen factors which the trial court might 
consider in MacDonald v. MacDonald. 
Gramme vs. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1978). 
Those fifteen factors and the corresponding facts of 
this case that apply to each are as follows: 
1. The social position and standard of living of each 
before marriage: Both were students. He was a 
medical school resident and she was in education. 
2. The respective ages of the parties upon marriage, 
he was 29, she was 23. 
3. What each may have given up for the marriage: 
There is nothing significant shown here. 
4. What money or property each brought into the 
marriage: No specific properties are listed in 
the record. Appellant brought his resident's 
salary. 
The physical and mental health of the parties: 
Both assumed to be good. 
The relative ability, training and education of the 
parties. He was a resident in pathology at the 
time of the marraige; she was earning a degree in 
education and later taught for two years. 
The time of duration of the marriage: 24 years. 
The present income of the parties and the property 
acquired during the marriage and owned either 
jointly or by each now: He earns $140,000 (gross) 
annually; as outlined above, she is expected to 
annually earn $74,274 as presently divided 
(without child support). A list of the properties 
acquired during the marriage and the values 
assigned to each is attached as Exhibit A. 
How it was acquired and the efforts of each in 
doing so: All of the assets listed by the court 
as marital property were acquired by Appellant's 
salaryf and by the yearly income generated by the 
inherited properties. The lands and stock listed 
by the court as Respondent's separate property 
were inherited. 
Children reared, their present ages and 
obligations to them or help which may in some 
instances be required: One child (13) resides 
with Respondent; another child (16) resides with 
Appellant; two older children (19 and 21) attend 
college. All four children will be supported 
through college. 
The present mental and physical health of the 
parties: Both are assumed to be good. 
The present ages: He is 54, she is 47. 
The happiness and pleasure, or lack of it 
experienced during the marriage: The parties 
began not communicating well the last few years 
of their marriage. 
14. Any extraordinary sacrifice, devotion or care 
which may have been given to the spouse or others: 
Nothing pertinent on these facts. 
15. The present standards of living and needs of each, 
including the cost of living: Both appear to have 
sufficient for their needs. Respondent did not 
submit a statement of her expenses; Appellant's 
statement was received through Exhibits D.3 and 
D.4 and through testimony. 
MacDonald, at 1070. The citations to the trial record are in 
the Statement of Facts. 
In addition to the above factors/ Appellant asks this 
Court to consider the following facts regarding the inherited 
properties themselves. 
1. The lands and stocks were inherited in 1966, 
four years after the parties had married. 
2. For approximately the next 18 years, the 
property was treated as a family asset. 
3. The parties filed joint income tax returns and 
paid taxes with joint funds. 
4. The income generated by the inherited properties 
was directed back into joint accounts and 
financial ventures and used as family income. 
5. At no time prior to seeking a divorce did 
Respondent indicate to Appellant that she viewed 
the lands and stock as her separate property. 
6. Appellant has supported Respondent with his salary 
for all but the initial two years of the marriage. 
Accordingly/ the inherited properties now remain 
intact. 
Again, no findings were made by the trial court to 
indicate that it considered any of the above factors in its 
decision. It appears that the allocation was based entirely 
on the fact that the properties were inherited. There is 
nothing in the record to show that the court evaluated 
Appellant's contributions in maintaining the property as a 
family asset, as was done by this Court in Preston. 
There is also no indication that the court considered 
the value of the inherited properties in reviewing 
Respondent's financial position. The property was given 
outright to Respondent, with the court's adjusting only the 
balance of the assets to afford each an equal share. The 
result is that Respondent left the marriage with $381,500 
above that which was awarded Appellant. 
The property has been treated by both parties as a 
marital asset for the past ten years. It is incongruous to 
now treat it as something different when the only thing that 
has changed is the filing of this suit. Accordingly, 
Appellant asks that the trial court's decision be reversed 
and the inherited property be included in the marital estate 
for purposes of computing an equitable division. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
RESPONDENT $600.00 A MONTH IN CHILD SUPPORT WHEN THE 
RECORD CONTAINS NO EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE JUDGMENT. 
The only reference to child support in the divorce 
decree reads as follows: 
It is further ordered that because of the 
large discrepancy between the parties' 
monthly income, plaintiff be and she is 
hereby awarded child support in the 
sum of $600.00 per month which is over 
and above what she would owe to the 
defendant as and for child support for 
the child in defendant's custody. 
(R. at 58). 
Appellant contests this ruling on two grounds: 
1) no evidence was introduced at trial establishing 
the financial needs of the child; and 
2) respondent has more than adequate income to 
provide for the needs of the child in her custody andf in 
fact has greater assets than appellant. 
The standard for determining the amount of child 
support is set forth in U.C.A., 1953, as amended, Section 78-
45-7 (2), as follows: 
(2) When no prior court order exists, or a 
material change in circumstances has occurred, the 
court in determining the amount of prospective 
support, shall consider all relevant factors 
including but not limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the support 
of others. 
This Court has held that the principal considerations 
in determining child support are "the needs of the child and 
the ability of the parent to provide such support." Forbush 
v*. Forbush, 578 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1978). 
Appellant argues that the trial court did not consider 
the needs of the child in establishing the amount to be paid 
by Appellant. The court based its award solely on the 
disparity of income between the parties. Judge Hyde 
explained his reasons for awarding child support in his 
Memorandum Decision as follows: 
As to the child supportf the figures here 
are not covered by our charts. There is 
a large discrepancy between the parties' 
monthly incomes, and the child living 
with the plaintiff should be entitled to 
the benefit of the defendant's 
substantial income. However, there are 
two children going to college. While 
they are technically emancipated, the 
parties both agree that they should go to 
college and they are being assisted in 
their college educations, which does 
constitute substantial expense. I hold 
that defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 
the sum of $600.00 per month over and 
above what she would owe to the defendant 
as and for child support. 
(R. at 22). 
No additional clarification as to the needs of the 
child is provided in the Findings of Fact. The Conclusions 
of Law again cite only to the disparity in the parties' 
income. The transcript of proceedings is void of any 
evidence as to debts incurred on behalf of the child or of 
his proportional share of monthly expenses. 
Appellant recognizes that the Court has discretion in 
the amount of support it orders, and that the trial court's 
decision will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of 
discretion. Bader vs. Bader, 18 Utah 2d 407, 424 P.2d 150 
(1967) . Appellant states that such an abuse of discretion 
occurred in this case because no findings were made regarding 
the child's needs. The Court of Appeals of Colorado, 
Division 1, found such an abuse of discretion based upon 
similar facts in In re Marriage of Berry, 660 P.2d 512 (Colo. 
App. 1983) . 
Berry involved a divorce action wherein a husband 
appealed that portion of the order requiring him to pay 
$1,000 per month per child for each of his two children. The 
trial court found that the children had no financial 
resources and that the husband, a dentist, earned $118,000 -
$165,000 annually. The court further found that the husband 
had assets totalling approximately $1,000,000 and had minimal 
expenses in relation to income. The wife was awarded 
$427,000 in cash and the family home, per stipulation of the 
parties. The husband contested the child support award on 
the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support 
the amount ordered. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding 
that the record lacked evidence as to the needs of the 
children. Id. 
The Court reasoned as follows: 
In determining child support, the primary focus is 
on the needs of the child, and the court may order 
a parent to pay an amount "reasonable or necessary" 
for the child's support after considering the 
relevant factors which include life-style and 
economic class. See [Section] 14-10-115, C.R.S. 
1973; Wright v. Wright, 182 Colo. 425, 514 P.2d 73 
(1973) . In this case, the only quantitative 
evidence of the children's needs was the wife's 
financial affidavit. The affidavit listed monthly 
expenses of $2,312 for her and the children, 
including a $300.00 per month church contribution, 
$160.00 a month in psychotherapy expenses for wife, 
and certain other expenses which were attributable 
solely to her. There was no breakdown in the 
affidavit identifying the needs or expenses of the 
children, nor was there any testimony concerning 
the amount of money required to fulfill the needs 
of the children. 
The court based its order, in part, on its findings 
that the standard of living would have eventually 
increased and that the children were emotionally 
upset, and were probably going to need 
psychological help. With regard to the increased 
standard of living, the trial court had before it 
no evidence on which to base its determination. 
Rather, it focused upon the substantial income of 
husband, and determined that $1,000 per month was 
11
 commensurate" with his income, notwithstanding a 
lack of evidence showing the children required that 
much monthly support. 
Id. at 513. 
In similar fashion, the trial court in the present case 
focused solely on the Appellant's income in determining child 
support, notwithstanding a lack of evidence showing that it 
is needed. 
While the Colorado support statute differs in wording 
from the Utah statute (See Appendix B), the basic thrust of 
the law is the same. Both statutes require the court to 
review the circumstances of the parties and consider the 
needs of the child when ordering support. The trial court 
abused its discretion in not issuing such findings regarding 
need and appellant accordingly requests that the trial 
court's order be reversed. 
Moreover, Appellant asserts that Respondent has more 
than adequate income to provide for the support of the 
thirteen year old boy in her custody. As outlined in the 
Statement of Facts, Respondent is expected to receive 
approximately $74,274 per year from her wages, dividends and 
payments from Appellant. In addition, her employment income 
could increase by $4,000-8,000 per year if she chose to 
continue teaching. Respondent was awarded $756,050 in the 
property division, while Appellant was awarded $374,500. 
Her award included all of the income producing property of 
the marriage. 
Respondent did not introduce any evidence at trial 
regarding her monthly expenses, beyond a statement that her 
rent was $800.00 a month. Appellant testified that his net 
income per month following payment of taxes, pension plan and 
professional corporation expenses is approximately $4,800 per 
month from which he pays household costs, his own expenses 
and supports the sixteen year old child in his custody. 
The Court below readily acknowledged that the income 
figures here are not covered by the Uniform Child Support 
Schedule. Appellant asserts that there is no evidence in the 
record to justify the award of $600.00 a month and that the 
decree does not reflect a proper consideration of the factors 
enumerated in O.C.A. 78-47-7 (2). As this Court noted in 
Forbush, when reviewing an order for child support, "the 
findings must themselves be sufficient to provide a sound 
foundation for the judgment. . ." id. at 519. Such findings 
are absent here and Appellant asks that the judgment be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the facts and law stated herein, Respondent 
respectfully requests that the case be remanded to the trial 
court for review with reference to the treatment of the 
inherited property as part of the marital estate and for 
review of the child support order. 
DATED this 2~{ day of August, 1986. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CAMPBELL, NEELEY & HADLEY 
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APPENDIX A 
Marital Assets Awarded t£ Plaintiff-Respondent2 
A. Park City property option. 
Value $5,000.00. 
B. Arkansas timber property (5/8 interest). 
Value $85,000.00. 
C. Arkansas/Louisiana Gas stock. 
Value $10,000.00. 
D. IRA accounts. 
Value $81,600.00. 
E. Woodtick property (1/4 interest). 
Value $62,500.00. 
F. 1982 Volvo automobile. 
Value $9,000.00. 
G. Furniture and appliances presently in her 
possession, including the following: Rocker, 
cedar chest, father's chair and desk, one 
stained glass door panel, miscellaneous 
personalties. 
Value $4,200.00. 
H. Plaintiff's savings. 
Value $15,000.00. 
A-l 
Inherited Property Awarded to Respondent as 
H£JL S^le ^ M gep^c^t? Property 
A. Arkansas timber property (1/8 interest) 
Equity $17,000.00. 
B. Louisiana timber property (675 acres at 
$500.00 per acre) . 
Equity $337,500.00. 
C. American Can stock. 
Equity $5,500.00. 
D. AT & T and Nynex stock. 
Equity $12,000.00. 
E. Homer National Bank stock. 
Equity $9,500.00. 
A-2 
Marital Assets Awarded tp_ Appellant: 
Sharon Circle home. 
Value $140,000.00. 
Lot 28. 
Value $50,000.00. 
Lot 32. 
Value $35,000.00. 
Woodtick property (1/4 interest). 
Value $62,500.00. 
Life insurance (cash surrender value). 
Value $51,500.00. 
Merrill Lynch pension benefit account. 
Value $88,000.00. 
CMA savings. 
Value $53,000.00. 
Coins. 
Value $3,000.00. 
Northeast Utility stock. 
Value $1,000.00. 
1979 Bronco automobile. 
Value $5,200.00. 
A-3 
Furniture and appliances presently in his 
possession excluding those specifically awarded 
to the plaintiff and including sporting equipment, 
guns, yard equipment, crystal, china and silver. 
Value $18,600.00. 
Savings account in Missouri. 
Value $2,000.00. 
A-4 
APPENDIX B 
Colorado Revised Statutes, 1973. 
14-10-115. Child Support. (1) In a proceeding for 
dissolution of marriage, legal separation, maintenance, or 
child support, the court may order either or both parents 
owing a duty of support to a child of the marriage to pay an 
amount reasonable or necessary for his support, without 
regard to marital misconduct, after considering all relevant 
factors including: 
(a) The financial resources of the child; 
(b) The financial resources of the custodial parent; 
(c) The standard of living the child would have 
enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved; 
(d) The physical and emotional condition of the child 
and his educational needs; and 
(e) The financial resources and needs of the 
noncustodial parent. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARTHA V. TOTZKEf 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HENRY A. TOTZKE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 93039 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial on the 
20th March, 1986, before the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, 
Judge of the above-entitled Court, sitting without a jury, 
plaintiff present and represented by counsel, 
Brian R. Florence, and defendant present and represented by 
counsel, Richard W. Campbell, and the parties having been 
duly sworn and testified, and the Court having been fully 
advised in the premises and having taken the matter under 
advisement and having subsequently issued its Memorandum 
Decision, now enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That defendant is an actual and bona-fide 
resident of Weber County, State of Utah, and has been for 
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more than three months prior to the comrencement of this 
action. 
2. That plaintiff and defendant are husband and 
wife, having been married to each other en 
January 27, 1962 in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 
3. That four children have been born as issue of 
this marriage, to-wit: TERRI LEE TOTZKE, born 
February 12, 1965; JACK TOTZKE, born October 9, 1966; 
MICHAEL TOTZKE, born April 8, 1969 and CHRIS TOTZKE, born 
April 28, 1973. That Terri is emancipated and living away 
from home. That Jack has reached his majority. 
4. That defendant has treated plaintiff cruelly, 
causing her great mental distress and suffering. 
5. That plaintiff is working fcr Ogden Food 
Service earning $6.00 per hour and also periodically 
receives dividends from inherited property. 
6. That defendant is employed independently by 
McKay-Dee Hospital and has an annual grcss income of 
$140,000.00. 
7. That during the course of the marriage, the 
parties have acquired the following marital assets which 
4-i 
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are valued as follows: 
A. Home at 5965 South Sharon Circle, Ogden, 
Equity - $140,000.00. 
B. Lot 28 (tennis court adjacent to home) 
Equity $50,000.00. 
C. Lot 32 across from home. 
Equity $35,000.00. 
D. Park City property option. 
Equity $5,000.00. 
E. Arkansas Timber Farm (5/8 interest). 
Equity $85,000.00. 
F. Woodtick/Pineview property (90 acres) 
(1/2 interest). 
Equity S125,000.00. 
G. Arkansas/Louisiana Gas stock 
Equity $10,000.00. 
H. Life Insurance. 
Equity $51,500.00. 
I. Merrill Lynch pension benefit account. 
Equity $88,000.00. 
J. CMA savings account. 
Equity $53,000.00. 
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K. Limited partnership. 
Equity $0. 
L. IRA in plaintiff's name. 
Equity $9,200.00. 
M. IRA and annuity in defendant's name. 
Equity $72,400.00. 
N. Savings account for children. 
Equity $10,000.00. 
0. Savings account in Missouri. 
Equity $2,000.00. 
P. Savings account (plaintiff's) 
Equity $15,000.00. 
Q. Coins. 
Equity $3,000.00. 
R. Northeast Utility stock'. 
Equity $1,000.00. 
8. That during the course of the marriage, 
plaintiff inherited from her father the following property: 
A. Arkansas timber property (1/8 interest) 
Equity $17,000.00. 
B. Louisiana timber property (675 acres at 
$500.00 per acre). 
Equity $337,500.00. 
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C. American Can stock. 
Equity $5,500.00. 
D. AT&T and Nynex stock. 
Equity $12,000.00. 
E. Homer National Bank stock. 
Equity $9,500.00. 
This property has produced approximately $200,000.00 in 
income and dividends which have been absorbed in the 
marital relationship and increased marital assets. 
9. That during the course of the marriage, the 
defendant inherited approximately $50,000.00 from his 
family which has likewise been absorbed into the marital 
relationship. 
10. That the defendant anticipates an additional 
$33,000.00 obligation for past taxes in connection with the 
limited partnership investments which should be paid from 
the CMA savings. 
From the foregoing Facts, the Court now makes and 
enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of 
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Divorce from defendant above-named and said Decree should 
become final immediately upon its being signed and filed 
with the Clerk of this Court. 
2. That defendant should be awarded the care, 
custody and control of Michael and plaintiff should be 
awarded the care, custody and control of Chris. That both 
parties should be awarded reasonable rights of visitation 
with the child not in their custody. 
3. That plaintiff should be awarded as her sole 
and separate property that which she inherited from her 
father which specifically includes the following: 
A. Arkansas timber property (1/8 interest) 
Equity $17,000.00. 
B. Louisiana timber property (675 acres at 
$500.00 per acre). 
Equity $337,500.00. 
C. American Can stock. 
Equity $5,500.00. 
D. AT&T and Nynex stock. 
Equity $12,000.00. 
E. Homer National Bank stock. 
Equity $9,500.00. 
4i 
FLORENCE 
and 
HUTCHISON 
ATTORNEYS AT 
LAW 
8 *6TH STREET 
DEN. UTAH 84401 
TOTZKE v. TOTZKE 
Civil No. 93039 
Findings and Conclusions 
Page 7 
4, That of the marital assets, the plaintiff 
should be awarded the following: 
A. Park City property option. 
Value $5,000.00. 
B. Arkansas timber property (5/8 interest). 
Value $85,000.00. 
C. Arkansas/Louisiana Gas stock. 
Value $10,000.00. 
D. IRA accounts. 
Value $81,600.00. 
E. Woodtick property (1/4 interest). 
Value $62,500.00. 
F. 1982 Volvo automobile. 
Value $9,000.00. 
G. Furniture and appliances presently in her 
possession including the following: Rocker, 
cedar chest, father's chair and desk, one 
stained glass door panel, miscellaneous 
personalties. 
Value $4,200.00. 
H. Plaintiff's savings. 
Value $15,000.00. 
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5. That of the marital assets, the defendant 
should be awarded the following: 
A. Sharon Circle home. 
Value $140,000.00. 
B. Lot 28. 
Value $50,000.00. 
C. Lot 32. 
Value $35,000.00. 
D. Woodtick property (1/4 interest). 
Value $62,500.00. 
E. Life insurance (cash surrender value). 
Value $51,500.00. 
F. Merrill Lynch pension benefit account. 
Value $88,000.00. 
G. CMA savings. 
Value $53,000.00. 
H. Coins. 
Value $3,000.00. 
I. Northeast Utility stock. 
Value $1,000.00. 
J. 1979 Bronco automobile. 
Value $5,200.00. 
FLORENCE 
and 
HUTCHISON 
ATTORNEYS AT 
LAW 
818 . MTH STREET 
>GDEN, UTAH 84401 
TOTZKE v. TOTZKE 
Civil No. 93039 
Findings and Conclusions 
Page 9 
K. Furniture and appliances presently in his 
possession excluding those specifically 
awarded to the plaintiff and including 
sporting equipment, guns, yard equipment, 
crystal, china and silver. 
Value $18,600.00. 
L. Savings account in Missouri. 
Value $2,000.00. 
6. That the CMA account being awarded to the 
defendant has actually been valued for purposes of this 
division at $20,000.00, creating a reserve for the 
defendant of $33,000.00 for the payment of taxes in 
connection with the limited partnership problems. Whatever 
remaining amount of the $33,000.00 which is not actually 
needed or used for taxes should be divided equally between 
the parties. 
7. That based upon the property distribution 
above, the plaintiff should be entitled to receive 
$102,250.00 from the defendant to equalize the marital 
asset property distribution. Judgment should therefore be 
awarded to the plaintiff in this sum which should be paid 
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as a cash settlement amortized over a nine-year period with 
10% interest per annum or $1,439.56 per month principal and 
interest. 
8. That because of the large discrepancy between 
the parties1 monthly income, plaintiff should be awarded 
child support in the sum of $600.00 per month which is over 
and above what she would owe to the defendant as and for 
child support for the child in defendant's custody. 
9. That each of the parties should be required to 
waive all claims of alimony from the other. 
10. That defendant should be required to maintain 
health and accident insurance on the two minor children and 
each of the parties should be required to pay one-half of 
all noncovered medical and dental expenses for said 
children. 
11. That plaintiff's request concerning defendant 
maintaining the plaintiff on his life insurance should be 
denied. 
12. That each of the parties should be required to 
pay their own attorney fees incurred herein. 
13. That defendant should be required to pay 
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plaintiff's costs incurred herein. Judgment should 
therefore be entered against the defendant in the sum of 
$54.00 for filing plaintiff's Complaint and one certified 
copy of the Decree. 
DATED this _ 
BY THE COWT: 
£ day of April, 1986, 
c^ 7%y*0£*4gJ27Z\ 
RONALD 0. HYDE, Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
[ICHARD W. CAflPBl 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARTHA V. TOTZKE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HENRY A. TOTZKE, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 93039 A A ' 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial on the 
20th March, 1986, before the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde, 
Judge of the above-entitled Court, sitting without a jury, 
plaintiff present and represented by counsel, 
Brian R. Florence, and defendant present and represented by 
counsel, Richard W. Campbell, and the parties having been 
duly sworn and testified, and the Court having been fully 
advised in the premises and having taken the matter under 
advisement and having subsequently issued its Memorandum 
Decision, and the Court having heretofore signed and files 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now orders as 
follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff be and she is 
OO 
I 
TOTZKE V. TOTZKE 
Civil No. 93039 
Decree of Divorce 
Page 2 
hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from defendant 
above-named and said Decree shall become final immediately 
upon its being signed and filed with the Clerk of this 
Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant be and he is 
hereby awarded the care, custody and control of Michael and 
plaintiff is hereby awarded the care, custody and control 
of Chris. That both parties are hereby awarded reasonable 
rights of visitation with the child not in their custody. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff be and she is 
hereby awarded as her sole and separate property that which 
she inherited from her father which specifically includes 
the following: 
A. Arkansas timber property (1/8 interest) 
Equity $17,000.00. 
B. Louisiana timber property (675 acres at 
$500.00 per acre). 
Equity $337,500.00. 
C. American Can stock. 
Equity $5,500.00. 
D. AT&T and Nynex stock. 
Equity $12,000.00. 
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E. Homer National Bank stock. 
Equity $9,500.00. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that of the marital assets, 
the plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the following: 
A. Park City property option. 
Value $5,000.00. 
B. Arkansas timber property (5/8 interest). 
Value $85,000.00. 
C. Arkansas/Louisiana Gas stock. 
Value $10,000.00. 
D. IRA accounts. 
Value $81,600.00. 
E. Woodtick property (1/4 interest). 
Value $62,500.00. 
F. 1982 Volvo automobile. 
Value $9,000.00. 
G. Furniture and appliances presently in her 
possession including the following: Rocker, 
cedar chest, father's chair and desk, one 
stained glass door panel, miscellaneous 
personalties. 
Value $4,200.00. 
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H. Plaintiff's savings. 
Value $15,000.00. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that of the marital assets, 
the defendant be and he is hereby awarded the following: 
A. Sharon Circle home. 
Value $140,000.00. 
B. Lot 28. 
Value $50,000.00. 
C. Lot 32. 
Value $35,000.00. 
D. Woodtick property (1/4 interest). 
Value $62,500.00. 
E. Life insurance (cash surrender value). 
Value $51,500.00. 
F. Merrill Lynch pension benefit account. 
Value $88,000.00. 
G. CMA savings. 
Value $53,000.00. 
H. Coins. 
Value $3,000.00. 
I. Northeast Utility stock. 
Value $1,000.00. 
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J. 1979 Bronco automobile. 
Value $5,200.00. 
K. Furniture and appliances presently in his 
possession excluding those specifically 
awarded to the plaintiff and including 
sporting equipment, guns, yard equipment, 
crystal, china and silver. 
Value $18,600.00. 
L. Savings account in Missouri. 
Value $2,000.00. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the CMA account being 
awarded to the defendant has actually been valued for 
purposes of this division at $20,000.00, creating a reserve 
for the defendant of $33,000.00 for the payment of taxes in 
connection with the limited partnership problems. Whatever 
remaining amount of the $33,000.00 which is not actually 
needed or used for taxes shall be divided equally between 
the parties. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that based upon the property 
distribution above, the plaintiff be and she is hereby 
entitled to receive $102,250.00 from the defendant to 
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equalize the marital asset property distribution. Judgment 
is therefore awarded to the plaintiff in this sum which 
shall be paid as a cash settlement amortized over a 
nine-year period with 10% interest per annum or $1,439.56 
per month principal and interest. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that because of the large 
discrepancy between the parties' monthly income, plaintiff 
be and she is hereby awarded child support in the sum of 
$600.00 per month which is over and above what she would 
owe to the defendant as and for child support for the child 
in defendant's custody. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each of the parties be 
and they are hereby required to waive all claims of alimony 
from the other. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant be and he is 
hereby required to maintain health and accident insurance 
on the two minor children and each of the parties shall be 
required to pay one-half of all noncovered medical and 
dental expenses for said children. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's request 
concerning defendant maintaining the' plaintiff on his life 
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insurance be and is hereby denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each of the parties be 
and they are hereby required to pay their own attorney fees 
incurred herein. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant be and he is 
hereby be required to pay plaintiff's costs incurred 
herein. Judgment is therefore entered against the 
defendant in the sum of $54.00 for filing plaintiff's 
Complaint and one certified copy of the Decree. 
DATED this 5 day of /Apri/1, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
DONALD 0. HYDE, Ju 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Attorney for Defendant 
T0TZKE1/C 
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HENRY A. TOTZKE, 
Defendant . 
Plaintiff is granted a divorce upon the grounds of 
mental cruelty. The divorce is to become final upon entry. 
The parties have two children not yet emancipated. 
Michael's custody is awarded to the defendant; Chris' custody is 
awarded to the plaintiff. Each party is granted a reasonable 
right of visitation with the child not in their custody. 
The major dispute between the parties appears to be the 
distribution of the property. Plaintiff inherited considerable 
property from her parents. The defendant takes the position that 
all property is joint and requests disposition accordingly. 
Plaintiff takes the position that the inherited property is 
separate and not part of the marital assets. I hold that the 
inherited property that is still easily identifiable is not a 
marital asset and does belong to the plaintiff as her separate 
property. The evidence shows that the defendant did inherit some 
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$50,000 which was absorbed into the marital relationship; 
however, the income from the plaintiff's property would be over 
$200,000 that was also absorbed into the marital relationship and 
no doubt has accounted for an increase in the marital assets. 
Each of the parties has submitted a proposed distribu-
tion. The defendant's proposal basically gives the plaintiff 
what she inherited, plus approximately $80,000 in other 
properties, and he takes the balance, which includes the family 
home. 
The requested division by plaintiff strikes me as basic-
ally being very fair. Her requested division is made so as to 
not disturb the defendant any more than necessary. This is an 
instance where alimony could easily be asked and probably be 
awarded. She makes $6.00 an hour; he makes some $140,000 per 
year. She makes no claim to his business and no request for 
alimony. The defendant argues that plaintiff's proposed request 
for distribution creates a real injustice for him. It appears to 
me that she has made every effort to make the division so as to 
not disturb the defendant's business or living arrangements. I 
must comment that it is much more equitable than his proposal, 
which in effect would have given her her inherited property, no 
alimony, no support, while he would take basically the marital 
assets and have no claim against his business corporation. 
a-2*; 2i 
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I accept and adopt the plaintiff's proposed distribution 
set out on the trial outline on Page 8, with the exception that 
in the distribution to the defendant, it appears the CMA savings 
correct figure is $53,000, rather than $64,000; further, holding 
a reserve for $33,000 for the 1979 taxes would be reasonable. If 
there is a $33,000 obligation on the 1979 taxes this would be a 
marital obligation. This would make the defendant's share total 
$476,800, rather than the $520,800, with $33,000 being held in 
reserve. If the $33,000 is not needed for taxes, this would be 
one-half plaintiff's funds. This would change the figure from 
$124,250 to equalize, to $102,250. I think it is reasonable that 
this difference be paid to her in a cash settlement over the 
nine-year period at 10% per annum. 
As to the child support, the figures here are not 
covered by our charts. There is a large discrepancy between the 
parties1 monthly incomes, and the child living with the plaintiff 
should be entitled to the benefit of the defendant's substantial 
income. However, there are two children going to college. While 
they are technically emancipated, the parties both agree that 
they should go to college and they are being assisted in their 
college educations, which does constitute substantial expense. I 
hold that the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of 
$600 per month over and above what she would owe to the defendant 
as and for child support. Defendant is required maintain health 
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and accident insurance for the benefit of the minor children. 
The parties shall divide non-covered medical and dental expenses. 
As plaintiff's proposed property distribution was basically 
accepted, she has waived alimony, therefore, none is awarded. 
As to attorneys' fees, one of the requirements is need. 
Admittedly, most people's needs are greater than their income and 
assets; however, in this case, plaintiff's total assets are 
better than half a million dollars. Each of the parties will 
bear their own attorney's fees. Plaintiff is awarded costs. I 
make no order in regard to life insurance. 
Plaintiff's attorney to prepare findings, conclusions 
and judgment in accordance herewith. 
DATED this £/ day of March, 1986. 
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